LAW NOTES
LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
STUDENT AND THE PRIVATE COLLEGE OR
UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION

As American higher education moves from the turbulent
sixties into what may be cautiously predicted as the even more
tumultuous seventies, it carries with it the scars of the "student
rights" battle. "The 'silent' college generation of the 1950's has
given way to a generation of student activists who have made
headlines throughout the world in recent years. Campus unrest
has become a major political and social factor."'
Such unrest has also become a major legal problem. A recent
article by Professor William W. Van Alstyne, a foremost
authority in this developing field, has proposed that the new law
school courses in race relations, rights of privacy, the law of
poverty, church-state relations, and reapportionment should
perhaps be joined in some of our law schools by a seminar on
student rights. The activism of the past decade has placed
unbearable strains on the traditional legal theories used to settle
occasional litigation between colleges and their more militant
students. 2 Such theories are no longer relevant Several principal
factors have contributed to influence this transition in legal
approach to student rights: (1)the changing character of higher
education; (2) the changing character of academic freedom (due
largely to the efforts of the American Association of University
Professors); (3) the changing character of constitutional liberties;
and (4) the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine.' What has
really happened, in effect, is that the relationship of higher
education itself to the society in which it exists has shifted
dramatically. The fact is increasingly recognized that collegiate
11.Mooney,
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ed. 1969).
2. Van Alstyne, A Suggested Seminarin Student Rights, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 547 (1969).
3. Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities:Some ConstitutionalConsiderations,2 L. IN TRANS. Q. 1 (1965).

4. Id. at 6-18.
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and even graduate education is essential for a growing number of
persons to earn their livelihood in modern society, as well as to
improve the quality of life. Enrollments are burgeoning, bringing
internal stresses at the same time as society looks to higher
education for increasing service to society itself. Movements such
as "civil rights" immediately find battlegrounds on college
campuses, where questions of constitutional rights are being
fought out. In the light of these changes, it is evident that a
rational theory of the legal relationship between the student and
the university can only develop within the context of the university
as an instrument of society.5 In this concept, student-university
relationships cease to be the private affairs the university has long
considered them. The university's responsibility to its students is
a responsibility to society.
As courts and theoreticians probe-perhaps it would be more
accurate to say "grope for"-the basis of the student-university
affiliation in all its complexity, certain clear distinctions emerge
from the discussions: (1) legal differentiation of the academic and
non-academic reasons why students might incur sanctions; and (2)
the distinction between the judiciary's treatment of statesupported and non-state-supported institutions, in other words,
the public sector and the private sector of education.
Three aspects of the above distinctions have become major
problem areas in the law on student rights, namely, the noncurricular side of student-university relations, the status of the
private university, and the position of the public sector of higher
education. As to academic questions, the judiciary's traditional
"hands-off' policy still prevails. Courts have simply (and quite
properly) refused to review substantive scholastic decisions; the
determination of delinquency in studies or components of
curriculum remains within sound administrative discretion.' In
fact, a statute necessitating a hearing in disciplinary dismissals
was held not to apply to academic disqualification. 7 This seems
to be the well established judicial trend, in spite of some
suggestions to the contrary.8 It may seem odd that faculty
5. McKay, The Student as PrivateCitizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 560 (1968).
6. Note, Developments in the Law--Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1152 (1968).
7. Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
8. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1069 (1969).
Cf. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. at 1139,
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members are left undisturbed in their grading procedures, while
actions of presidents and deans of students in dismissing students
are subject to judicial review.9 However, the difference in
treatment appears valid when one considers the insuperable
difficulties which would ensue from court grading of papers!
[C]ourts are expert in applying the first amendment and the
due process clause, but the persons on campus are the experts
in deciding the academic value of a particular piece of
work. .

.

. I perceive no basis on which a student can claim

a constitutional right to a D rather than an F, so long as the
grade given him was the good faith academic judgment of his
instructor. 0
Everyone knows, in theory, and those of us with long years of
experience in college or university teaching are aware, in practice,
that students do indeed question the "good faith judgment" of
their instructors. Nonetheless, the "hands-off" policy of the
judiciary in this respect is exceedingly sound; courts might very
well find themselves out of their depth if they undertook the
construction of curricula or the analysis of grade distribution
summaries. Such matters are best left to the accrediting agencies.
The other problem areas which have arisen from discussions
of student-university relationships are closer to court competence.
The non-curricular side of the student-university affiliation, the
status of the private university, and the position of the public
sector of higher education all involve constitutional issues, as well
as non-constitutional theories. The first of these three problem
areas-non-academic reasons for sanctions against students-has
often been subsumed into the other two. Judicial handling of the
nature and validity of the sanctions has depended on whether the
university is public or private. In,-the emerging problem of
residential privacy, though it is still a blurred and undeveloped
area of the law, the public-private distinction has been less cogent,
as will be shown. For the most part, however, the public-private
distinction has been recognized in most of the treatises on
emerging legal principles and procedures applicable to student
suggesting that even the grade given to a student should perhaps be subject to judicial
review if it leads to his expulsion. For an analysis of an interesting case involving

conflicting testimony of professors attempting to introduce evidence on their divergent
grading of plaintiff student's papers, see Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or
Suspensions by PrivateUniversities, 5 WILLAmrE L.J. 277, 278 (1969).
9. Wright, supra, noteS at 1070.

10. Id.
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rights, and numerous cases have discussed and/or used the
distinction as the basis for their holdings. The legal relationship
between the student and the private college or university may be
analyzed through a discussion of the following areas: (i)
Historical background- constitutional protection of private
education along with absence of student rights in all higher
education; (2) Development of constitutional protection of student
rights-its applicability to private institutions and to the
developing area of residential privacy; and (3) Applicability of
non-constitutional theories-their validity in defining the studentuniversity relationship and in protecting student rights.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

American higher education began as a private, usually
church-related enterprise. By charter, private institutions can be
classified thus: institutions chartered by the Crown, for example,
Columbia; institutions chartered by one of the early English
colonies in the New World, that is, Harvard; institutions
chartered by Act of Congress, such as George Washington
University; and the large number of institutions chartered by the
state."' Commonwealth or state colleges and universities were a
subsequent development. 12 In the first quarter of this century,
severe challenges to the concept of private education were
discouraged by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
4
Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 and Meyer v. Nebraska.
Interestingly enough, both holdings were on fourteenth
amendment grounds and thus shed light on cases in the 1960's in
which certain clauses of the fourteenth amendment were held not
applicable to private institutions. In Meyer, the main issue was the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute prohibiting instruction in
or teaching of a foreign language in public, private,
denominational and parochial schools, to children below the
eighth grade, and hence, barring teaching of reading in the
German language to a ten-year-old by plaintiff instructor in a
11. Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities,
5 WILLAMETrE L.J. at 277 n.6 (1969).
12. Cf H. GOOD & J. TELLER, A HISTORY OF ,VESTERN'EDUCATION 473-75 (3d ed.
1960).
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Lutheran parochial school. 15 The issue was whether the statute, as
construed, infringed upon liberties guaranteed to plaintiff by the
fourteenth amendment. 6 The Court held that the statute as
applied was "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end
7
within the competency of the State.'
The Pierce case was also decided upon grounds of an
unreasonable deprivation of liberty, violative of the fourteenth
amendment. At issue was the Oregon Compulsory Education Act
of 1922, requiring that all children be educated in public
institutions. Reiterating the State's lack of competence to infringe
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court held that the Act
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control." 18 It is evident from Pierce that private schools and
colleges enjoy immunity under the fourteenth amendment from
unreasonable interference with their liberty to serve students of all
ages in accord with the desires of parents."9 The logical subsequent
question is whether institutions which have been warranted against
deprivations of their rights to life, liberty, and property must,
under the fourteenth amendment, grant these rights to the students
over whom they exercise certain controls. The question applies, of
course, to both the public and the private sectors of education.
The historical answer to the question was "No" for both
public and private institutions. Courts were reluctant to interfere,
even in non-academic areas, with the discretionary authority of
university officials. Part of their reason for this may have been
well-founded deference to the expertise of educators, and an
understandable fear that their interference on behalf of students
might threaten the well-being of educational institutions." Perhaps
a more cogent reason was the fact that the statutes and charters
establishing both public and private institutions of higher
education concerned themselves with trustees and corporate
relationships and not with student-university relationships.2' At
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(1968).
21.

Id. at 393, 397.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403.
268 U.S. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Beaney, Students. Higher Education, and the Law 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 514
Id. at 513.
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any rate, American institutions assumed from the start that,
whatever might be the traditions and practices of medieval
European universities or other "ancestors" of higher learning,
their governing boards and administrative officers had unlimited
control over curriculum and virtually unlimited (or at least, rarely
2
challenged) power to control student conduct and activities. It
should be noted-although this aspect seems to have been
overlooked in most discussions of the subject-that American
higher education's roots in private, usually church-related schools
is significant in this regard. Many schools began as seminaries to
train ministers for the various denominations. The majority of
their students were those who could afford to pay. It was natural,
therefore, that there was an historically-accepted emphasis on
discipline, and on the obligation of the "seminaries" (as Harvard
and others were called) to require conduct becoming a Christian
and a gentlemen. Legally, the courts gave substance to this
concept in the doctrine of in loco parentis, the idea that the school
or university stands in the place of parents, and thus is responsible
for the moral training of the student as well as his intellectual
progress. Such training was generally accomplished by exacting
strict conformity to regulations which would ensure good order on
the campus and an upright moral life for the student. It was this
concept of student-university relationships which led Editor
Kramer of the Harvard Crimson to write: "The typical university
is only slightly more democratic than the army, if less
unpleasant."3
Reinforcing the doctrine of in loco parentis was the
universally accepted notion that university attendance was a
"privilege," and not a "right." In a country which early espoused
the idea of the right of all citizens to elementary, and later
secondary education, only a small minority of the population
could aspire to the institutions of higher learning. Gradually, as
state teachers' colleges (which helped make compulsory education
at the lower levels possible) evolved into full-fledged colleges, and
state universities mushroomed, access to higher education became
common-and even necessary for many jobs or professions.
However, the right-privilege dichotomy still prevailed. As recently
22. Id.
23. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1968 (Magazine), as quoted in Wilson, ProtestPolitics and
CampusReform, 21 AD. L. Rav. 45, 50 (1968).
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as the mid-1930's, the Supreme Court spoke of attendance at
public universities as a privilege, not a right. 4 Clearly, then,
judiciary policy would leave broad latitude to institutions in
making disciplinary decisions-short of arbitrariness, which
courts have always investigated 25-because the institutions stood
"in the place of parents" and because the students did not have
a "right" to attend the institution anyway. As late as 1959, a
student who requested review found that he had lost a "privilege"
rather than vindicated a "right. 2' 6 Only the last decade has
witnessed any substantive shift in the law in this area.
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL

PROTECTION OF STUDENT

RIGHTS

When the Fifth Circuit handed down the decision in Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education2 7 in 1961, the importance

of the "right-privilege" dichotomy as a legal theory was
minimized. With the recognition in Dixon that "[w]henever a
governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the
Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process
of law," student rights were protected from invasion by statesupported institutions, who could no longer invoke privilege of
attendance as a means of denying due process to the student.
Hence, it ceased to matter much whether the student was there by
"right" or by "privilege"; he could not be severed from the
institution without being heard in his own behalf.
Student rights under the fourteenth amendment are much
more clearly discernible for public institutions than for private
ones, although it took the courts many decades to articulate such
rights even for the public sector. It is not difficult to see why. The
law by its very nature values continuity, developing by slow steps
as conditions of life change.20 Until the university itself began to
24. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).

25. But while testing arbitrariness, courts have given administrators the benefit of a
presumption of reasonableness, cf. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204
(1913); Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); State
ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W. 2d 822 (1942), cert. denied 319 U.S.

748 (1943).
26.
27.
28.
29.

Steier v. New York State Education Commissioner, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied368 U.S. 930 (196 If.
Id. at 155.
Wright, supra, note 8 at 1027-28.
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reevaluate its essential mission and its relationship to society, the
courts could hardly be expected to impose a new self-image upon
higher education. When the change came it came dramatically,
one of those exceptional movements of "sudden about-face" when
the law turned 180 degrees 0 Illustrative of the shift are two cases
only a couple of years apart. In Steier v. New York State
Education Commissioner' in 1959, one of the majority opinions
decreed, in effect, that the plaintiff was free under the United
States Constitution to say what he wished, but not free to say it
as a Brooklyn College student.3 2 In spite of a stirring dissent
calling for more humane treatment of Steier, he lost his case and
his status at Brooklyn College, which he had the "privilege" of
attending.
But the voices of eloquent dissenters and theoreticians were
not to be lost on the courts. The dissent in Steier was added to
the lament of Professor Warren Seavey, in a now-famous and
much-quoted article:
It is shocking that the officials of a state educational
institution, which can function properly only if our freedoms
are preserved, should not understand the elementary principles
of fair play. It is equally shocking to find that a court supports
them in denying to a student the protection given to a
pickpocket.3
Within two years after the Second Circuit refused relief to Steier,
the Fifth Circuit heard Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education. Dixon changed the pattern for state-supported
institutions, standing as it does for the basic proposition that the
courts will recognize and protect student rights to procedural due
process, and will not allow the state to condition the right to an
education upon the waiver of the constitutional right to
procedural due process 4
30. Id.
31. 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
32. Id. at 20. Arthur Steier wrote two letters to the president of the college
complaining about college dominance of student organizations. His comments would
probably cause little stir on campus today, when presidents are accustomed to such
criticisms. After being readmitted on probation a few months later, he gave the story of
his probation to the college newspaper, and was consequently expelled.
33. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1407
(1957).
34. The elements of procedural due process as applicable on college campuses have
been thoroughly reviewed in many treatises,'notes, and court opinions over the past decade.
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However, the Dixon holding is restricted to the public

university. Courts-barring extenuating circumstances 35 -have
generally held it inapplicable to private colleges and universities.

An analysis of their reasons for so holding, as well as an inquiry
into comments in the law journals, may serve as a basis for
forecasting possible future trends. The vast literature which has
sprung up on student rights contains many isolated comments and
several specific analyses of the applicability of constitutional
principles to private institutions in the area of student rights. 36
Theoreticians generally separate the procedural issues from the

substantive question of the right of private institutions to set
legitimate goals and to establish reasonable rules to achieve such

goals. On the procedural issue, most writers indicate that the
trend is towards due process requirements for all institutions,
public or private, but it has proven difficult to base this trend on
They will not be repeated in detail here. Briefly, the elements are: notice of grounds of the
proposed disciplinary action; the opportunity to appear before those responsible for the
disciplinary action and make such showing or explanation as desired; adequate notice of
the nature of the evidence, cf. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp.
649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967), which adds: "The precise nature of the notice and hearing will
of course vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case." Most courts do
not recognize an absolute right to counsel in such proceedings. However, colleges and
universities which have set up disciplinary procedures generally give the student the option
of counsel if he so desires.
For full discussions of the developing recognition of the right of students in statesupported institutions to procedural due process, see Van Alstyne, Judicial Trend Toward
Student Academic Freedom, 20 IU. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1968); Van Alstyne, ProceduralDue
Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368 (1963); Note, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1045, 1134-1143 (1968); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
Enforced- Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. REv. 301
(1968); Note, The Fourteenth Amendment and University DisciplinaryProcedures, 34
MIssouRI L. REv. 236 (1969); Note, College DisciplinaryProceedings, 18 VAND. L. REV.
819 (1965)-the article includes suggestions for legislation in this area, plus a "model
statute."
35. Cf. Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965), where the
court held that
[a]lthough the University of Tampa is not a state or city institution in the
usual sense, its establishment was largely made possible by the use of a surplus
city building and the use of other city land leased for the University
purposes. . . . [T]he City's involvement in the establishment and maintenance
was of such a nature as to require .holding that "state" action under the
Fourteenth Amendment was involved in the denial of appellants' rights.
(Citations omitted.)
36. Cf Van Alstyne, Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA.
L. REV. 290 et seq.; Wright, supra, note 8 at 1028; Symposium, 45 DENVER L.J. 497
(1968); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced- Guidelines for University
DisciplinaryProceedings,53 MINN. L. REv. 301 et seq. (1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 281 F.Supp. 747,754-61 (D.C. La. 1968).

1970]

LA W NOTES

constitutional principles. Discussions of the applicability of
constitutional protection of student rights in private institutions
usually depend on one or both of two theories: (1) the stateaction/private-action dichotomy; and (2) the "public function"
concept as applied to private colleges and universities.
The most obvious test of "state action" is control by the
state in one form or another-direct financial control, or
administration of a school by state officials acting in their official
capacity, or far-reaching regulation by the state 7 Since none of
these factors is usually applicable to private associations, courts
have sometimes sought certain combinations of factors to provide
a sufficient nexus to justify a finding of "state action. ' 38 Such
factors might include space leased from the state; the public
character of a building; special state franchise; particular
requirements in a will as in the latest Girard case, Pennsylvania
v. Brown.39 participation in an overall state funding plan; and the
like. 0 Or it might be that "state action" attaches to certain
administrative units. 4 It is well known, for example, that the
science departments of many prestigious institutions receive a
major portion of their funding from the state or federal
government, while the humanities or social sciences in the same
schools tend to be privately funded.4 2 Should, then, state action be
applied by the courts to the whole, since each part benefits from
the other subdivisions of the university? A ramification of the
"state action" theory is the concept of education as a public
function, whether under private or public auspices-a rationale
applied to other private groups, such as "company towns 43 and
"party primaries.""
Even the most recent cases substantiate the reluctance of
courts to extend the "state action" clause of the fourteenth
amendment to private universities in the ways noted above. Most
37. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv.at 105658.

38. Id. at 1058.
39. 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967).

40. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,
1058-60. Cf Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
41. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. at 105662.
42. Id. at 1061.
43. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
44. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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of them cite Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority'5 in support
of the concept that the fourteenth amendment is not concerned
with "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights." 4 In Browns v.
Mitchel4 7 the only issue was whether the actions of the University
of Denver in disciplining thirty-nine student participants in a
prohibited sit-in constituted action under color of State law,4"
or-to put it more precisely-whether the State of Colorado had
so major a part in the University's affairs that it could be termed
a "joint participant" in the challenged disciplinary proceedings.
The whole matter thus becomes a question of degree; the court
brings forth its hypothetical measuring rod to ascertain the length
and breadth of "state involvement." Its rather uncomplex
reasoning runs thus: (1) the University receives no state funds; (2)
its special tax exemption is not shown to be the means of dictating
or influencing University affairs; (3) the claimed involvement is in
no way associated with the challenged activity; (4) therefore, the
requisite "state action" is absent4 No other valid conclusion
could have been reached.
Grossner v. The Trustees of Columbia University 0 reached
the same conclusion, with some variations in the reasoning.
Plaintiffs' arguments seemed so weak that the court does not
appear to have worked very hard at overturning them.5 1 Simply
stated, these arguments alleged that the state was involved in
Columbia's affairs in: (1)a large percentage of income from
public funds-federal and state; (2) lease of public land by New
York City for construction of a new gymnasium; (3) the
University's public function of educating persons.52 On the issue
45. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
46. Id. at 722.
47. 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 594.
49. Id. at 596.
50. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
51. The opinion quotes rather extensively from plaintiffs' brief; illustrative of its
quality is the following "argument" to prove that the "rule of law" must not be overrated:
Had the Americans agreed that the rule of law, however despotic, must always
prevail; had the Americans felt that dropping the tea in the harbor was going
too far; had the Americans not focused on fundamental principles, this country
might still be a colony today.

Id. at 545 (footnotes omitted). All this was supposed to prove that the action of the
students in occupying five of Columbia University's buildings for approximately a week
was action protected by the First Amendment.

52. Id. at 546-47.
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of income from public funds, the court reasoned that receipt of
money alone is insufficient to establish the recipient as a
government agency, indicating quite rightly that, if it were
sufficient, all kinds of contractors and enterprises that depend
heavily on government business for large proportions of income
would find themselves charged with "state action. ' 53 The "public
function" issue is handled so summarily that it is really not dealt
with at all. "Plaintiffs' remaining thought-that Columbia
performs a 'public function' in 'educating persons' which may be
'likened to a company town or party primary system'-is, briefly,
without any basis. It is not sounder for Columbia than it would
be for Notre Dame or Yeshiva."54 The remark patently begs the
question (to say it is "no sounder for Columbia" than for others
does not, of course, tell whether it is sound at all), though it is
admitted that education is in the public interest. The court simply
refrains from probing the issue of whether "public function"
means "state action," dropping an indignant footnote which
implies that the question was settled long since: "If the law were
what plaintiffs declare it to be, the difficult problem of aid to
'private schools'-specifically, parochial schools-would not
exist." Citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters,55 the note adds:
"Indeed, the very idea of a parochial school would be
unthinkable." 56 Neither the plaintiffs nor the court in Grossner
differentiated the concepts of "public service" approved by the
state for performance by private institutions or associations, and
genuine "public functions" performed by state officers or
agencies.
However, there are scattered portents of possible changing
interpretation. In a celebrated dictum in the case of Guillory v.
Administrators of Tulane University,7 Judge J. Skelly Wright,
after presenting Tulane's argument that "the University, because
of its private status, is immune from the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment under the doctrine of the Civil Rights
Cases," 58 queries:
At the outset, one may question whether any school or
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 548.
Id. at 549.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
287 F. Supp. 535, 549 n.19 (1968).
203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
Id. at 858.
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college can ever be so "private" as to escape the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In a country dedicated to the creed
that education is the only "sure foundation**of freedom,"
"without which no republic can maintain itself in strength,"
institutions of learning are not things of purely private
concern. . . . Clearly, the administrators of private colleges
are performing a public function. They do the work of the
state, often in the place of the state. Does it not follow that
they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they not then
agents of the state, subject to the constitutional restraints on
governmental action, to the same extent as private persons who
govern a company town, or control a political party, or run a
city street car and bus service, or operate a train terminal. 9
The court then finds indications that Tulane is a public institution:
(1) because of its history as a state institution endowed by a
private trust fund, and (2) because of its special indicia of present
state involvement. On rehearing during trial on the merits later the
same year, the court held that Tulane was a private university
with insufficient state involvement to bring it under the fourteenth
amendment. 0 The message is again clear: "state action" is not
applicable to private universities. The legal relationship between
them and their students must be sought elsewhere.
The same holding created an anomalous situation in Powe v.
Miles," because of its peculiar fact situation. Seven students
joined in a prohibited demonstration on the campus of Alfred
University, a private institution in New York. Four were students
at the Liberal Arts College of Alfred University; three were
students of the New York State College of Ceramics, a statesupported institution which Alfred University operates under
contract with the State of New York. The New York State
College of Ceramics is on Alfred University's campus. The seven
students were thus from the same campus, joined in the same
prohibited demonstration, violated the same regulations, ignored
the same orders from their common Dean of Students, and were
suspended at the same hearing. Nevertheless, the court
distinguished the four Alfred University students from the three
Ceramics College students. Answering, in the manner of Browns
and Grossner, the usual "government aid" and "public function"
59. Id. at 858-59 (citations omitted).
60. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D. La.

1962).
61. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
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arguments, along with several unique ones about the Ceramics
College affiliation, the court held "state action" inapplicable for
the four Alfred students, who were, consequently, not protected by
the fourteenth amendment. 62 The other three students, on the
contrary, were fully protected by fourteenth amendment
guarantees against deprivation of due process by the same
63
President and the same Dean of Students at the same hearing.
Though in the end it did not matter anyway, since plaintiffs'
rights were not infringed, the case illustrates well the inadequacy
of present legal posture in student rights cases. 6 Even if the results
reached were fair to the students, there is something wrong with
legal guidelines that lead to such a curious result. From the
anomalous holding in Powe v. Miles, the conclusion is inescapable
that the "state action" clause of the fourteenth amendment is too
narrow a yardstick to measure the requisite degree of fair play
essential in the legal relationship between students and
universities, public or private.
A similar confusion exists in the currently most controversial
aspect of student-university relationships, the area of residential
privacy, but the confusion has different causes. Instead of the
rather sharp dichotomy between applicability of constitutional
principles in the public and the private sectors of education, one
finds the legal guidelines blurred and undeveloped. Both public
and private colleges and universities are grappling with the
problem of the student as university resident. In the few cases
which have thus far been litigated, the distinction between
"public" and "private" fails, and constitutional theories have not
been applied. An analysis of the reasons for the holdings in the
several cases concerning residential privacy may exemplify the
need to define more adequately the relationship between the
student and his university in the eyes of the law. Two recent cases,
62. Id. at 82. Appzllants' argument is analogous to the point made in the text, at
notes 40-44, concerning identification of the administrative unit to which "state action"
attaches. It is entirely cordeivable that a Powe v. Miles situation could arise at an
institution where the major portion of the science budget was funded by the state or federal
government, while humanities and social sciences were privately funded. Could, then, the

university be considered as exercising "state action" relative to its science majors, but be
"private" relative to English or history majors? The question itself highlights the anomaly.
63. Id.
64. Beaney, How Private Are Private Institutions of Higher Education?, in
PROTEST AND THE LAW 178 (G. HOLMES ed. 1969).
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one in a California Appellate Court, the other in a Federal
District Court in Alabama, exemplify the current approach of the
judiciary to the question. The California case involved a private
institution (The California Institute of Technology), the other a
public one (Troy State University). In People v. Kelly,65 police,
escorted by a school official, conducted a warrantless search of a
student's room to look for property reported stolen during several
burglaries. The court accepted the search as justifiable on the
grounds that police had probable cause for the student's arrest,
and that dormitory rules allowed the person in charge to enter any
room in an emergency.66 "Emergency" was not defined, but the
discretion of school officials to decide the presence of an
emergency was assumed. Since the court was satisfied that school
officials were acting reasonably, within their discretionary power,
fourth amendment safeguards for the student were not significant.
By accepting residence in the dormitory, the student impliedly
promised to adhere to its rules, with an implied waiver of his
constitutional rights. In the eyes of the People v. Kelly majority,
the legal relationship between the student and his private
university was a one-sided arrangement recognizing few student
rights.
The most notable case on residential privacy is the recently
litigated Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State
University.17 The court upheld the right of the University to
authorize a search of a student's room, without his consent, by
narcotics agents who found marijuana. Suspicion was aroused by
information from a reliable source, and the Dean of Men had
authorized the search. The student's right to be free of
unreasonable search and seizure as required by the fourth
amendment was acknowledged, but the validity of the University's
written regulation reserving the right to enter for inspection
purposes did not depend on a waiver of fourth amendment rights
or a contractual theory, but on the reasonableness of the
University's exercise of its supervisory duty, and on the certainty
of probable cause. "It is settled law that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit reasonable searches when the search is
conducted by a superior charged with a responsibility of
65. 195 Cal. App. 2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177'(1961).
66. Id. at 676, 678, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 181, 184.
67. 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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maintaining discipline and order or of maintaining security. 6' 8
The "reasonableness" test, if applied without full consideration of
students' constitutional right to privacy, tends to place the interest
of the institution in a paramount position over that of students. 9
Both the Moore and the Kelly decisions emphasize the university's
responsibility to maintain discipline and to promote an
educational atmosphere by reasonable means. The constitutional
issue, therefore, has not been squarely faced in a court decision.
It would seem that students' fourth amendment rights with respect
to institutions of higher learning stand in the same position that
fourteenth amendment rights stood ten years ago, at the time of
the Steier decision. Increased student concern with constitutional
rights-at both private and public institutions-makes it
predictable that the residential privacy issue will have its Dixon.
Discussion will doubtless ensue about whether the actions of
private college officials are invasions of privacy by private
individuals, and thus unprotected by the fourth amendment, or
whether they are in some fashion actions of government agents or
officials, with fourth amendment responsibilities. Presumably
courts will uphold the traditional view7" of non-applicability of the
fourth amendment to private party seizures, and, by implication,
the non-applicability of the exclusionary rule. The issue could be
complicated by developing trends on the admissibility of certain
types of evidence under the fifth amendment. 71 Whatever the
complications, the real question will have to be faced: what rights
have the students, and to what extent may these rights be abridged
72
by some preeminent role of the institution of higher learning?
The problem is being brought to a head by the fact that the
student population explosion has forced off-campus living on
68. Id. at 730-31.
69. Bible, The College Dormitory Student and the Fourth Amendment-A Sham or
a Safeguard?,4 U.S.F. L. REV. 50, 61 (1969).
70. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921):
Fourth Amendment. . .protection applies to governmental action. Its origin

and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities
of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than

governmental agencies. ...
71. Note, Private Party Searches and Seizures-A Province of the Fifth Amendment,

3 U.S.F. L. REV. 159, 164-69 (1968). However, since "'search and seizure" tends to turn
up real evidence rather than testimonial evidence in this era of student drug use, the fifth

amendment question may not become pertinent.
72. Note, College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Problems on
Campus, 3 GEORGIA L. REv. 426,429 (1969).
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many students, with a resulting desire of numerous others to
follow their colleagues to the greater freedom and security of offcampus living. Obviously, students who do not reside in
dormitories retain their fourth amendment protections against
unreasonable search and seizure; they are subject only to the
ordinary landlord-tenant relationship.13 Thus they know where
they stand with regard to privacy and property rights, and they
have recourse in the courts for any violation. Administrators and
courts have not yet fully conceded the right of a student to privacy
in his dormitory room. "Apparently, the rules of reasonableness
and probable cause have so far proved too rigid for extension into
this area. '74 When the change in the law comes-as it surely
will-students at private institutions may find that courts will
have to turn to non-constitutional theories in the residential
privacy area, as they have in due process problems, in order to
define the legal relationship between students and private
universities.
APPLICABILITY OF NON-CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

A lengthy discussion entitled "The University and the
Student," incorporated into the court's opinion in Zanders v.

Louisiana State Board of Education,75 highlights the two most
common theories traditionally used to characterize the basic
relations existing between the university and the student-the in
loco parentis doctrine and the contract theory.7 Also suggested as
possible modes of defining the relationship are the fiduciary and
the tort theories. Basically, what is happening is this: courts have
refused to extend the "state action" concept to private colleges
and universities, thus barring the student from successful showing
that his legal relationship with his school is one in which the
courts will see to it that the school does not infringe his
constitutional rights. But courts are still faced with students and
universities as adversaries in judicial proceedings. The rights and
responsibilities of one must be weighed against the rights and
73. Id. at 435.
74. Id. at 440.
75. 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
76. Id. at 755. It is a little puzzling that such a long and excellent treatise was
included in the opinion; it seems to be extraneous dicta, since plaintiffs' prayer for
declaratory and injunctive relief rested on grounds of alleged violations of their rights

secured by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and the
court concluded that there was no evidence of the violation of these rights. Id. at 750.
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responsibilities of the other, in terms acceptable before the law as
imposing a duty on one or the other to act in a certain way. The
difficulty is compounded by the fact, noted earlier, that the
university's relationship to society itself is in transition, at the
same time as the university's clientele becomes larger and more
independent, with higher proportions of adult students. The result
of all these factors has been to put a strain on the nonconstitutional theories courts have used in litigating studentprivate college cases; taken individually, the theories are not quite
complex enough to define a subtle and sensitive relationship. The
following is a brief discussion of each theory and how it has been
applied, then analysis of its validity in defining the studentuniversity relationship, and in protecting student rights and
university responsibilities.
Things were easy (for the school anyway) in the days of in
loco parentis. Early cases, such as Gott v. Berea College,7 cast
the college or university authorities in the role of solicitous parents
watching over the mental, moral, and physical well-being of their
charges. But the demise of in loco parentis as a definition of the
relationship is now complete--and anyway the analogy always
limped. Real parents may not legally sever all ties with their
offspring, as educational institutions may do in extreme cases.
The theory of in loco parentis has always been inadequate to
define the school's relationship with its adult students-graduate
and professional students, for example-and is still more
unsatisfactory today when large numbers of undergraduates have
reached their majority. Because of their size, state universities
repudiated the doctrine sooner than smaller schools, especially
sectarian ones-which often retain vestiges of this approach. The
basic difficulty with in loco parentis as a statement of legal
relationship was that it seemed to invite excessive and arbitrary
regulation. The students either conformed, or departed-"shape
up or ship out," as the college jargon has it. Thus, the doctrine
was ineffective in protecting student rights. The university's duty
to act for the good of its students (in the school's opinion of that
good, not the student's) was the prime consideration.
A more benevolent form of in loco parentis describes the
77. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
78. Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 876,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463,470 (1967).
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student-university affiliation as a fiduciary one, to be "recognized
as a consensual relationship with certain commonly understood,
intrinsic characteristics which should be retained regardless of the
language contained in the registration form, the bursar's receipt
or the school bulletin."" The student, in other words, places his
confidence in the good faith performance by educators of tasks for
the student's benefit. The university is, so to speak, his
educational mentor, whose integrity he trusts. Such a fiduciary
characterization of the student-university relationship would be
applicable to the relationships between students and public or
private universities0 Its use would thus obviate the dual set of
standards now applied in student-university cases.8" Although no
case has yet relied on this theory, presumably-were they to use
it-courts would hold that the university must maintain a very
high standard of unselfish concern for the sole good of the
student-beneficiary. Institutions of higher learning would be
required by law to demonstrate that their actions re students met
the 'legal standards of the trustee of a charitable or private trust.
However, the fiduciary theory is inadequate from the point of view
of the student. "Because of the exceptionally high standard of
conduct placed upon the fiduciary (for excellent reasons in a trust
situation), there is necessarily very little responsibility, if any at
all, placed upon the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship. 8 2
Thus, the student, who should bear prime responsibility for
himself and his own education, if "education" is to take place, is
placed in a passive role. Another corollary of a legal fiduciary
relationship between student and school would be the shifting of
burden of proof to the trustee, that is, the institution, in any
challenge to its position or decisions. Such a shift in burden of
proof could have a healthy effect on the care and caution which
a university brings to decisions relative to students, but it could
have corresponding ill effects of requiring the university to
respond to capricious and frivolous challenges, thus diverting it
from its real goals.
Another legal theory suggested as a possible definition of the
79. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory,

54

KENTUCKY

L.J. 643, 667 (1966).

80. Id. at 673.
81. Cf Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), and text accompanying notes 5760, supra.
82. Munch, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 533, 534 (1968).
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student-university relationship is the tort approach, which
"provides the means of rectifying an unjustified injury to this
relationship."8 Though a tort theory has been warmly supported
as a possible solution to some student-university problems, 4 it
would seem that it does not really define the nature of the
relationship. Many types of injuries are actionable in tort, even
among complete strangers. If a university could justify its actions
in suspending or expelling a student in terms of weighing the
relative interest of the university and the student, and could thus
defend itself against liability in tort, its former or subsequent
relationship with the student would still remain undefined. Or if
the student won damages for deceit, or negligence, or for causing
severe emotional distress, he would still not have his right to due
process or right to privacy protected, unless he wanted to file
another lawsuit.
The most frequently used of the non-constitutional theories
of the student-university relationship in cases involving private
institutions has been the contractual theory. Principles of contract
law are applied as standards in judging conflicts between the
student and his college or university. Typically, the reasoning goes
something like this: attendance at a private institution is a
"privilege" governed by certain conditions; these "conditions"
are normally expressed or implied in the bulletin or other official
publications such as dormitory regulations, and they serve as
notice of the academic standards and non-academic conduct
expected of the student. By his enrollment in the institution, the
student impliedly (or expressly, in some cases) warrants that he
knows and undertakes to abide by the rules of the institution; his
failure to abide by them is a breach of his "contract," punishable
in serious situations by suspension or expulsion. Judicial
acceptance of reasoning such as the foregoing is evidenced by
court reliance on these arguments in cases involving private
institutions. In Dehaan v. Brandeis University,s the court upheld
the University's action denying to plaintiff the privilege of
registering again at Brandeis, and cited in support of its action a
provision of the University's catalog, reserving the right to sever
83. Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities,

5 WILLAMEl-ra L.J. 277,291 (1969).
84. Id.
85. 150 F. Supp. 626 (D.C. Mass. 1957).
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a student's connection with the University for any reason deemed
appropriate by the institution. The Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, in Carr v. St. John's University," drawing its
precedents from prior New York cases, explicitly relies upon an
implied contract, with conditions on both sides." Continuing to
use the terminology of contract law, the court speaks of implied
terms or conditions on the student's side as obvious and necessary
to the total contract. "[T]here is implied in such contract a term
or condition that the student will not be guilty of such misconduct
as would be subversive of the discipline of the college or school,
or as would show him to be morally unfit to be continued as a
member thereof."' s Quoting from the regulations on discipline,
the court shows that the University was acting within its
jurisdiction and its honest, factually-based discretion, and holds
that "a court may not review the exercise of its discretion""0 in
such circumstances. In other words, both parties to the implied
contract are held to its terms and conditions.
On the debit side of the contractual theory of the studentuniversity relationship are several significant points, which have
analogies in commercial contracts. First, the bargaining position
in a student-university "contract" is very unequal." The student
does not, of course, have to attend any specified institution. He
may select any of several different kinds of colleges, the
regulations of which are known to him in advance. But should he
wish to go to a particular school, he often has no choice but to
accept the stated terms and no initial power to bargain aboutany
of the conditions.91 It is a simple "contract of adhesion."
86.
87.
88.
89.

17 A.D. 2d 632,231 N.Y.S. 2d 410 (Sup. Ct. A.D. 1962).
Id. at 635, 231 N.Y.S. 2d at 413.
Id.
Id. at 636, 231 N.Y.S. at 414.

90. This point should not be overstressed, either in questions of residential regulations
or in other rules setting guidelines for student conduct. Those working directly with
students in higher education today know that students have a strong, sometimes decisive
voice in making regulations which conern them. The "unequal bargaining power" is

sometimes between the individual student and a student organization rather than between
the individual student and the administration.
91. Cf. Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp. 609 (1967), dismissed as moot,
412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the court held that where the university's catalog
stated that the university reserved the right, and student-by his attendance-conceded this

right, to require withdrawal at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to the university,
the students were without constitutional, statutory, or contractual rights to notice of
charges and hearing before expulsion. The case was appealed, and the students won a
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Secondly, it seems unreasonable to charge students with
acceptance of regulations of which they may be unaware, and of
which they had no more notice than the fact that they were mailed
92
a copy of the university bulletin when they applied for admission
Cogent arguments have been advanced to demonstrate the validity
of the contractual definition of the student-university
relationship.9 3 It is reasoned that private college administrators
should create a system of private contractual law to regulate
university life; if they do not, courts will probably find or create
contractual theories in order to avoid harsh results.94 Certainly
such a system of private contractual law would clarify in many
ways some of the legal aspects of the student-university affiliation.
But the contract will always be something of a "contract of
adhesion." The undergraduate student remains a junior colleague
in the educational venture, with the university a disproportionately
strong partner.9 5 In such an arrangement, the degree of "fair
play" is very dependent on the extent to which university officials
have an enlightened view of their role.
CONCLUSION

The above analysis demonstrates that the legal relationship
between private institutions of higher learning and their students
is diffuse and unclear. Constitutional theories neither define the
relationship nor protect the rights of students, because courts have
painstakingly shown them not applicable. Doubtless the courts are
correct. Why should it be necessary to mutilate constitutional
language in order to reach a result which is fair both to the
student and to his school? Non-constitutional theories, as the
courts have applied them, have operated mostly in favor of
administrators, upholding their reasonable authority for lack of
judicial power to do otherwise. No national legal standard has
arisen, because student conduct cases litigated with respect to both
private and public institutions have so far been adjudicated below
the Supreme Court level, with divergences among the Federal
temporary restraining order in 1967. Last year (1969) the case was dismissed as moot,
since the students had graduated.
92. Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities,
5 WILLAMsTrE L.J. 277, 282 (1969).
93. Wilkinson and Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J.

121, 125 (1970).
94. Id. at 126.
95. Magrath, Comment, 45 DENVER L.J. 614, 616 (1968).
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District Courts and Courts of Appeal." The unknown factor is
when the Supreme Court will see fit to grant certiorari and rule
on the validity of the various theories with respect to private
universities and colleges. The constitutional and nonconstitutional theories alike, the areas they attempt to protect,
shed light on what the issues are in the student-school legal
relationship. The constitutional theories protect the right to
procedural due process. It is predictable that they will soon
protect the right to privacy. Neither of these rights is really
protected by the non-constitutional theories, because when the
courts use them, they lean heavily on reasonable administrative
discretion.
How, then, can a rational theory of the relationship be
established for private institutions-one which courts will support
and uphold? Ideally, there should not have to be a "legal"
relationship. Higher education by its very nature should be in the
vanguard of the enlightened, the just, the true. Students are
citizens. They should be treated as individuals worthy of
respect-and they should so treat others. Because they are human
beings-rather than because the institution they attend is publicly
or privately funded-they should have fair procedures in
disciplinary matters, and they should respect these procedures.
Because they are persons, they should have the rights to privacy,
commensurate with the rights of others, in their place of residence.
Administrators, faculties, and students should participate in
setting up rules and codes of conduct. The university itself should
take the initiative.
Nothing that has been said implies that all institutions will
become carbon copies. Private institutions have the right to be
what they were founded for, to set their own goals and purposes,
and to define-with student participation-the reasonable means
to effectuate these goals. They violate their own purpose if for
"self-protection" they take refuge in ambiguous or overly general
rules." They may enforce well-advertised codes of conduct, and
96. Cf.note 97, infra.
97. The entire area of the constitutionality of over-vague, over-general, or ambiguous

campus rules has become progressively more prominent in the burgeoning law of student
rights. At present, the question is less pressing in private universities, because of the abovediscussed reluctance of the courts to apply constitutional theories to private educational

institutions. However, in view of recent discussions such as Wright, supra, note 8 at 106067, and the holding in Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969), affirming a
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discipline students who violate them, safeguarding due process.

Presumably, the best of them will limit rules to matters which
adversely affect the university community's pursuit of its
educational purposes." Once such goals and purposes are set,
courts could look at the established means to achieve them, test
the reasonableness of these means in the light of the institution's

announced goals, and adjudicate accordingly-affording
substantive as well as procedural due process to the students. The

right of the institution to be the kind of university or college it
wishes to be, as well as the right of the student to "fair play,"
would thus be safeguarded and preserved.

But this is not Utopia. Perhaps these suggestions put too
much burden of perfection on both students and schools. The
courts will doubtless be needed to settle conflicts. Whatever
theories they may use, court "solutions" will be less than
adequate for the definition of a relationship more complex than
any of the theories. However, there seems to be no present

alternative.
SALLY

M.

FURAY

holding of unconstitutional vagueness of the University of Wisconsin's "misconduct" rule,
it behooves all educational institutions, public or private, to express their standard of
conduct in "reasonably clear and narrow rules." Id. at 167. While assuming that the
power of the university to protect itself against disruption is undisputed, the Soglin court
notes that "Power to punish and the rules defining the exercise of that power are not,
however, identical," and concludes that the term "misconduct" as a standard "must fall
for vagueness. . . . It contains no clues which could assist a student, an administrator or
a reviewing judge in determining whether conduct not transgressing statutes is susceptible
to punishment by the University as 'misconduct'." Id. at 167-68. Like the Soglin court,
Professor Wright, in the article just cited, disagrees with the judges in Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968) which avers that legal
doctrines of unconstitutional broadness do not apply to standards of student conduct.
Wright, in fact, goes even further than the Soglin court in expressing his conviction that
courts should (and, "in the long run the courts will") accept "the same requirements of
specificity that are applied to criminal statutes." Wright, supra note 8 at 1065.
98. McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 560-61 (1968).

